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An email looks like it came from your own address. Was your mailbox hacked?

An email that shows your own address in the From field is not, on its own, evidence that someone logged in to your mailbox. An outside sender can impersonate that address. The useful question is whether the message arrived from an authorised sending service and whether there is separate evidence of account activity.

If the message threatens you or demands money, do not reply, pay, open attachments or follow its links. Use your normal phishing report button or contact IT through a number or channel you already know.

Keep the original, not just a screenshot

A screenshot shows what the inbox displayed, not how the message reached you. Keep the original in your mailbox and tell IT when it arrived and who received it. If IT asks for a copy, use your approved reporting channel and attach the original message as an .eml rather than copying the text into a new email. Do not circulate it among colleagues or paste the headers into a public website: they can contain addresses and routing details.

On a computer in Gmail, the Show original option displays the message’s full headers. You do not have to interpret those headers yourself to report the scam.

Why one check can fail and a later one pass

Imagine a suspicious message reaches your organisation’s receiving service and is then delivered to staff through a forwarding group. The receiving service and the final mailbox can be checking different sender identities. Here is a simplified, fictional example, not a screenshot or a copy of anyone’s mail:

  1. Original arrival: SPF records a soft fail, there is no passing DKIM signature aligned with the visible From domain, and DMARC fails. The original checks did not authenticate that domain for this message.
  2. After forwarding: The group sends the message onward under its own identity. The final service records passes for the forwarding identity. Those passes do not retroactively authenticate the original From domain.

SPF checks whether the connecting server is authorised to send for the envelope sender’s domain. DKIM verifies a signature tied to a signing domain. DMARC checks whether at least one passing SPF or DKIM result aligns with the domain people see in the From address. A pass is about use of a domain, not whether the words in the email are true or whether a particular person sent it. Google’s forwarding guidance explains why authentication can change in transit.

Ask IT to identify which receiving system recorded the result and which domain it checked. The latest or most conspicuous line marked pass is not enough. IT should use authentication results from systems it trusts and corroborate them against message tracing where available. A failure can also result from a misconfigured legitimate sender or changes in transit, so it is not a verdict by itself.

Check the mailbox separately

To look for an actual compromise, IT should compare the message trace with account sign-ins and mailbox audit activity for the relevant period. Useful leads include messages you did not send, unexpected sign-ins or MFA prompts, and new forwarding settings or inbox rules. A clean Sent folder alone is not enough to rule out compromise. If other signs point to account misuse, see our email account takeover warning signs and recovery guide. Microsoft’s response guide shows which records administrators can use in Microsoft 365.

Tell IT immediately if you entered a password, approved a sign-in prompt, opened a suspicious file or made a payment. If money was sent, contact your bank through its usual fraud channel straight away. Follow your organisation’s incident procedure and the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s business email compromise guidance if account misuse or fraud is suspected.

Make it easy for staff to report the next one

Give staff one clear reporting route and ask for three details: when the message arrived, who received it and what anyone did in response. Keep the original with IT rather than asking everyone to forward it. Our guide to unexpected SharePoint links from a familiar sender covers a related trap, and Osmicro’s cyber security awareness training can help teams practise these checks.

Bottom line: Treat the message as suspicious. Authenticate the original sending path and investigate the mailbox as two separate checks.